FROM PETISTA WAY TO BRAZILIAN WAY: HOW THE PT CHANGES IN THE ROAD by Goldfrank, Benjamin & Wampler, Brian
ARTIGOS
FROM PETISTA WAY TO BRAZILIAN WAY: HOW THE 
PT CHANGES IN THE ROAD
Benjamin Goldfrank
Brian Wampler
Resumo
Quando Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva venceu a disputa presidencial em 2002, ele e 
seu  Partido  dos  Trabalhadores  (PT)  tiveram  a  maioria  dos  observadores 
convencidos de que esta era uma nova fase para a democracia do país. Afinal o 
PT tinha construído uma reputação de mais de vinte anos para um bom governo 
e ética na política. Apesar disso o governo Lula tem sido severamente minado 
por  escândalos  de  corrupção,  que  surpreendeu  até  o  mais  cínico  dos 
observadores  do  PT  e  fomentou  amplo  descontentamento  entre  muitos  dos 
antigos defensores do partido. Esse artigo expõe quatro vertentes de explicação 
para  a  queda  da simpatia  do  PT,  envolvendo:  o  elevado  custo  das  eleições 
brasileiras, as decisões estratégicas da facção dominante do partido, restrições 
econômicas sobre uma eventual administração Lula e sobre as dificuldades do 
sistema multipartidário.
Palavras-chave:  Corrupção;  Partidos  Políticos;  Partido  dos  Trabalhadores; 
Mensalão; Presidencialismo.
Abstract
When Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’  da Silva won Brazil’s  presidency in 2002, he and his 
Workers’ Party (PT) had most observers convinced that this was a watershed 
moment for the country’s democracy. After all, the PT had built a reputation for 
over  twenty  years  for  good  government and  ethics  in  politics.  Yet  Lula’s 
government  has  been  severely  undermined  by  corruption  scandals,  which 
surprised  the  most  cynical  PT-watchers  and  fostered  broad  disillusionment 
among many long-time PT supporters. This article lays out four interweaving 
strands of explanation for the PT’s fall from grace, involving: the high cost of 
Brazilian  elections,  the  strategic  decisions  of  the  party’s  dominant  faction, 
economic constraints on an eventual Lula administration, and the difficulties of 
multi-party presidential systems.
Key-words: Corruption;  Political  Parties;  Workers  Party  (PT);  Mensalão; 
Presidential System.
From Good Government to Politics as Usual: How the Workers’ 
Party (PT) Lost its Way
When Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva won Brazil’s presidency in 2002, 
he and his Workers’ Party (PT) had most observers convinced that this 
was a watershed moment for the country’s democracy. The victory of 
this former shoeshine boy, metal worker, and union leader symbolised 
to  many  the  arrival  to  power  of  Brazil’s  excluded  masses  and  the 
opportunity  to  put  into  practice  the  PT way of  governing,  lauded as 
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participatory, redistributive, and, above all, transparent. Five years and 
several astounding corruption scandals later, few illusions remain. Lula 
won the second round of the 2006 election with 61% of the vote, but his 
inability to win in the first round is largely attributable to perceptions 
that the PT has been involved in the very types of behaviours that they 
spent twenty-five years publicly denouncing. The PT has been gravely 
wounded  by  the  scandals,  starting  with  the  so-called  mensalão,  or 
monthly bribe scandal, which brought resignations from the party’s top 
leaders  and  members  of  Lula’s  cabinet  as  well  as  renewed  calls  for 
reforming Brazil’s political institutions. The mensalão involves allegations 
of  regular  payments  to  the  PT  government’s  congressional  allies  in 
addition  to  illegal,  off-the-books  campaign  donations  (known  as  the 
caixa dois) and improper use of public funds and contracts to secure 
those donations. Brazil has seen its fair share of scandals over the years
—from the  impeachment  of  its  first  democratically  elected  president 
after the transition, Fernando Collor, to the purported “vote-buying” that 
accompanied Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s successful attempt to amend 
the  constitution  to  allow  for  his  re-election—so  what  was  surprising 
about the mensalão was the party involved.
From  its  inception  in  the  early  1980s,  the  PT  stood  for 
incorruptibility,  refusing  to  accept  the  military’s  offer  of  indirect 
presidential  elections  during  democratization,  leading  the  charge  for 
investigating President Collor, and emphasizing clean government at the 
municipal level, where it was increasingly successful. By the time of the 
2002 race,  the PT had earned a reputation among voters  as Brazil’s 
most honest party (GOLDFRANK, 2004, p. 207-208; Fundação Perseu 
Abramo, 2006). Scholars of the country’s notoriously weak party system 
regularly noted the PT’s outlier status as virtually the only ideologically-
driven,  internally  democratic,  and  disciplined  party.  Lula’s  2002 
presidential  campaign  stressed  the  party’s  ethics  and  anti-corruption 
message. Its first commercial showed rats chewing on a Brazilian flag 
and the caption: “Either we finish them off or they finish off Brazil. Ciao, 
corruption – a campaign by the PT and the Brazilian people” (MARKUN, 
2004, p. 313-314). Just a few years later, an aide to the PT president’s 
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brother  was  caught  in  Brasília’s  airport  with  100,000  dollars  in  his 
underwear1, Lula’s finance minister and chief of staff resigned, as did the 
PT’s  president,  secretary-general,  and  treasurer,  all  tied  to  the 
mensalão scandal. How did the PT move from a party that built its party 
brand on honesty and transparency to a party in which high-ranking 
officials were engaged in systematic forms of corruption?
Lula tried to minimise the scandal in the press, saying that the PT 
had only done what other parties do, but that is precisely the point: “In 
the end – and this is the mother of all issues – many people voted for 
the PT because the party did not do what the others do” (GOIS, 2005, p. 
14). Why would the party put its hard-fought, vote-getting reputation 
for good government at risk? Why did it change course to become like 
the rest? Or, as its conservative opponents have long asserted, was the 
PT’s supposed ethical patrimony simply a farce all  along? This article 
lays out four interweaving strands of explanation, involving: the high 
cost  of  Brazilian  elections,  the  strategic  decisions  of  the  party’s 
dominant faction (the  Campo Majoritário or Majority Camp), economic 
constraints  on an eventual  Lula administration,  and the difficulties  of 
establishing legislative majorities in multi-party presidential systems.
These four interweaving strands have their roots in institutional, 
economic,  and  governance  processes.  The  predominant  mode  of 
explanation in contemporary political science is institutionalist, but we 
argue that it is insufficient to only consider institutional factors due to 
tremendous economic and societal demands faced by elected officials in 
Brazil (SAMUELS, 2003; AMES, 2001; HUNTER and POWER, 2007). The 
PT’s  fall  from  grace  is  best  explained  by  the  political  institutional 
pressures  that  induced  party  leaders  to  change  their  strategies,  by 
national  and  international  markets  that  provided  a  limited  range  of 
options, and by intra-party conflicts regarding the strategies that should 
be utilized to govern effectively. Any one of these explanations by itself 
offers an incomplete picture. Only by looking at all four interweaving 
1 The aide also had 209,000 reais (about US $100,000) in his suitcase (ESTADO DE SÃO 
PAULO, July 9, 2005, p. 1). As the main purpose of this article is to explain the reasons 
behind the PT’s descent into corruption rather than provide an exhaustive accounting, we 
only use the names of the key politicians.
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strands  can  we  explain  why  the  PT  fell  from  grace.  First  we  must 
describe the party’s rise and acquisition of its reputation for ethics.
Rising PT Fortunes
The PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) was founded in 1979 by a 
diverse group of activists who shared a commitment to ending Brazil’s 
military dictatorship,  establishing democracy,  and implementing some 
form  of  socialism.  Unions,  social  movements,  intellectuals,  and 
progressive sectors of the middle class formed the base of the new party 
(KECK, 1992). The PT was established as a  bottom-up party, in which 
party  members  had  voice  and  vote  on  policy  decisions,  political 
orientation,  and  leadership  selection.  The  PT  established  the  modo 
petista  de  governar (PT  way  of  governing),  which  was  used  as  a 
governing strategy as well as a party branding strategy (GOLDAFRANK, 
2004;  NYLEN,  2000).  The  PT  placed  strong  emphasis  on  internal 
democracy,  allowing  members  to  practice  democracy and  giving 
minority  factions  the  opportunity  to  influence  their  fellow  party 
members. Nonetheless, within the context of PT democracy, a dominant 
faction – the  Campo Majoritário – emerged in the mid-1990s. Minority 
groups did have voice, but control of the PT has been in the hands of 
Lula, José Dirceu, and their São Paulo allies since at least 1995. Internal 
democratic procedures have encouraged minority factions to remain in 
the  party  because  there  is  a  shared  understanding  that  the  PT 
represents  a  new  way  of  conducting  politics  that  would  eventually 
change Brazil. While the party never explicitly defined the socialism it 
sought, it did uphold a strong ideological commitment to the inversion 
of  priorities,  which refers  to the using of  the state—local,  state,  and 
federal  governments—to  re-orient  Brazil  away  from  its  traditionally 
unequal, exclusionary political and economic practices.
In order to overhaul  Brazil,  the PT has long advocated a two-
track  strategy.  The  twin  emphases  include  a  social  struggle,  which 
occurs by building a movement from the ground up that is capable of 
engaging in direct political action to advance PT causes and an electoral  
struggle, which became increasingly important and increasingly focused 
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on elections for executive positions. Lula has been at the centre of the 
PT since its founding in 1980 and is closely associated with the Campo 
Majoritário,  which  increasingly  favoured  a focus  on winning elections 
over  social  movement-style  activism  (FREIRE  DE  LACERDA,  2002). 
Indeed,  the  electoral  fortunes  of  the  PT  have  improved steadily  and 
dramatically since its first efforts in 1982 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 - PT election results, 1982-2006
Election Year 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Governors 0 0 0 2 3 3 4
Federal Deputies 8 16 35 49 58 91 83
% of Chamber 1.70% 3.30% 7% 10% 11% 18% 16%
Election Year 1982 1985 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Mayors 1 2 38 54 110 187 411
Mayors in 
Capital Cities 0 1 3 4 2 6 6
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitora (www.tse.gov.br)
When the PT won mayoral and gubernatorial offices, the elected 
officials often emphasized participatory decision-making as a means to 
invert priorities, appeal to its social movement allies, demonstrates its 
commitment to honesty in office, and thereby build a base of support by 
distinguishing itself from Brazil’s myriad other parties. The most famous 
case, Porto Alegre’s Participatory Budgeting (PB), which captured the 
attention of PT activists and ordinary citizens, rests on the principles of 
deliberation, transparency, social justice, and direct citizen involvement 
in  selecting  policy  outcomes  (ABERS,  2000;  BAIOCCHI,  2005; 
GOLDFRANK, 2007; WAMPLER and AVRITZER, 2004). More than 200 PT 
mayors and even a few governors have adopted Participatory Budgeting. 
The  PT  also  succeeded  in  the  1990s  at  developing  other  innovative 
policies,  such as School  Scholarship (bolsa  escola),  which –  from its 
inception in Brasília – provides targeted funds for low-income families to 
entice them to ensure that their children attend school regularly. While 
national  PT  legislators  constantly  demanded  investigations  into 
corruption by the ruling parties, subnational PT administrations let the 
party demonstrate  its  reformist  credentials  by illustrating that  it  was 
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capable of governing creatively and responsibly. By the time of the 2002 
election, public opinion polling demonstrated that Brazilians judged the 
PT to be the country’s most honest party by a wide margin, which was 
one  factor  among  many  in  Lula’s  favour  in  his  fourth  run  at  the 
presidency (GOLDFRANK, 2004, p. 207-208).
Campaign Costs
To win, Lula needed money. Our starting point for examining the 
PT’s unexpected descent into the politics of the expected is to note that 
Brazilian elections are comparatively expensive, at least as expensive as 
those in the United States, and possibly more (SAMUELS, 2001, p. 33). 
An avowedly socialist party like the PT in an unequal capitalist country 
like Brazil could only raise relatively small amounts of money, especially 
given a law prohibiting union donations. According to David Samuels’ 
(2001)  exhaustive  study  of  Brazilian  campaign  finance,  corporations 
provide by far the most funds, which helps to explain why PT candidates 
for federal deputy received on average eleven times less money than 
non-left candidates in 1994, and six times less in 19982. In the 1989, 
1994, and 1998 presidential campaigns, the winning candidates vastly 
outspent Lula. In 1994, the first year campaign contributions were made 
public, Fernando Henrique Cardoso officially received (and likely spent) 
more  than  twenty  times  as  much  as  Lula,  and  received  more  than 
eighteen times as much in 19983. In each race, Cardoso won in the first 
round.  The other  three major  parties  in Brazil  – the PSDB (Party of 
Brazilian Social  Democracy),  the PMDB (Party of Brazilian Democratic 
Movement), and the PFL (Party of Liberal Front) – maintained strong 
and  deep  ties  to  Brazil’s  industrial  and  agricultural  elites,  which 
obviously eased their campaign financing burdens.
The  campaign  finance  story  changed  dramatically  in  2002, 
however,  with  Lula  officially  outspending  all  the  other  candidates, 
including his top competitor, José Serra, who was Cardoso’s intended 
successor.  According  to  the  Superior  Electoral  Court’s  records,  Lula 
2 Our calculations from Samuels (2001, p. 39).
3 Our calculations from Samuels (2001, p. 31).
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spent nearly 40 million  reais compared to Serra’s R$ 35 million, and 
outspent  his  other  main  competitors  by  two-to-one  and  ten-to-one 
margins (www.tse.gov.br). This official reversal of fortunes is interesting 
in its own right, with Lula’s campaign spending jumping from below R$ 5 
million in 1994 and 1998 to nearly R$ 40 million; but the scandal is in 
the unofficial figures, where it is estimated that Lula’s campaign raised 
R$ 200 million in off-the-books donations (ATTUCH, 2006, p. 16). How 
did Lula’s campaign coffers – official and otherwise – suddenly swell? As 
philosopher  and  former  PT  voter  Ruy  Fausto  argues,  after  the  PT’s 
efforts to legalise union contributions failed, and with the party growing 
and needing money for campaigns,
at  a  certain  moment  –  at  whose  initiative?  – 
businessmen  (not  sympathetic  to  the  party)  became 
disposed to ‘help’ the PT[…]. Businessmen do not like to 
have all their eggs in one basket, and there must have 
been indications (the lack of reality of the projects) that 
the  PT’s  revolutionary  discourse  did  not  have  much 
future (FAUSTO, 2005, p. 211).
This  interpretation  is  seconded  by  one  of  the  investigative 
journalists who broke the scandal in mid-2005, Leonardo Attuch, who 
adds that those who spent millions to prevent Lula from winning in the 
earlier  races,  financed him in  2002 as an insurance policy (ATTUCH, 
2006, p. 16, 28-29). Attuch notes that the financiers gave equally to 
Serra’s campaign (his inside sources estimate that Serra also received 
roughly R$ 200 million extra-officially) and that they generally preferred 
to donate off the record.
Illegal contributions to Lula’s 2002 campaign were the precursor 
to a bigger scandal,  the illegal  cash payments to congressional  allies 
during  Lula’s  presidency.  When  the  election  was  over,  despite  its 
fundraising  success,  the  PT  still  owed  R$  20  million  in  presidential 
campaign costs and some R$ 35 million for governors’ races (ATTUCH, 
2006,  p.  37).  In  2003,  the  PT  Treasurer,  Delúbio  Soares,  began 
engaging in unusual financial transactions with Marcos Valério Fernandes 
Souza, a marketing executive whose firms secured loans to cover the 
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campaign expenses of the PT, and soon thereafter, its allies4. Drastically 
simplifying, the money path operated like this: Souza’s publicity firms 
took out loans for or with the PT; the PT used the funds to pay its 2002 
national campaign debts and its 2004 municipal campaign expenses and 
to provide campaign funds to members of parties allied with the PT in 
congress,  such as the PMDB, PP, PL,  and PTB; and Souza’s  publicity 
firms received contracts from federal government agencies, the funds of 
which they are assumed to have used in part to pay off the loans.
Clearly, the 2002 campaign was a turning point in PT finances, 
and a key part of the mensalão scandal, but while this look at campaign 
costs answers some questions, it raises a host of others. Why did the 
PT’s campaign treasurers take the risk of illegal donations? Was this a 
new practice in 2002 or did it build on past corruption? And why did the 
PT pay off members of other parties as well?
The  Consolidation  of  the  Majority  Faction:  Moderating  (and 
Corrupting?) the PT
The  second  explanatory  thread  concerns  the  group  that 
controlled the PT, the Campo Majoritário. This faction, tied to Lula and 
led by José Dirceu, gained the upper hand within the PT in 1995 and 
was  able  to  engage  in  political  strategies  of  its  choosing,  such  as 
focusing  resources  on  executive  elections,  pursuing  alliances  with 
centrist and catch-all parties, and adopting moderate platforms. Since 
1984, the PT has held regular elections for its national, state and local 
leadership  positions.  At  the  national  level,  a  majority  coalition,  first 
called Articulação and later expanded to become the Campo Majoritário, 
won eight of the party’s nine internal elections, with Lula named party 
president  for  most  of  the  1980s  and  early  1990s.  Since  1989,  Lula 
occupied a centre-right position within the party and he aligned himself 
with the right groups to ensure control of the party. The left wing of the 
4 In June 2005, bank documents were revealed to the press that showed Souza as a 
guarantor on loans to the PT, alongside the party president, José Genoíno, and treasurer, 
Soares, and that one of Souza’s publicity firms, SMP&B, had made monthly payments on 
the loan. At the same time, Souza’s firms had large contracts with the federal government 
(http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u70166.shtml). For details on the money 
trail, see Flynn (2005, p. 1236-1238).
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party  won the party’s  presidency  one time,  in 1993,  which left  it  in 
control  for  the  1994  national  election.  The  1994  campaign  was 
disorganised, with leadership being shared by three different individuals. 
The 1994 election was a humiliating loss for Lula, as Cardoso rode the 
success  of  a  new  economic  plan,  the  Plano  Real,  to  a  convincing 
presidential  victory.  Lula  strongly  opposed  the  Plano  Real and  its 
perceived success left him looking out of touch with average Brazilians.
The alleged incompetence of the PT’s left-wing and Lula’s vow to 
never again to run for president without direct control over his campaign 
led to the 1995 internal party elections that would dramatically re-shape 
the PT. For those elections, Dirceu helped create the Campo Majoritário 
by uniting the centre and right factions of the party; he emerged as the 
PT’s National President and held that position for the next seven years. 
Dirceu used his victory to consolidate the power of the centrist group, 
creating  a  party  within  a  party to  ensure  loyalty  to  him as  well  as 
building alliances at the PT’s local and state levels to ensure that Lula’s 
group  would  continue  to  control  the  party  (FLYNN,  2005,  p.  1254). 
Under the direction of Dirceu’s faction and over the objections of the left 
factions,  the  PT:  1)  moved  farther  away  from  its  ground-up,  social 
movement strategy and instead concentrated its energy and resources 
on  winning  elections  for  mayors,  governors,  and  the  presidency;  2) 
moderated its national campaign platforms; and 3) began entering into 
electoral coalitions with parties that previously had been vetoed as too 
corrupt, personalist, centrist, or clientelist by the PT’s leftist factions.
By 2002, the PT’s make-over was complete, as Lula’s campaign 
made clear. The massive rallies and get-out-the-vote efforts conducted 
by thousands of  the PT members in the past were replaced by slick 
television  spots  and  giant  show-mícios (concerts  by  national  music 
stars). Lula did not mention revolution or socialism, but rather respect 
for  international  contracts  and  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
agreements. The campaign slogan was Lulinha – paz e amor (Little Lula 
– peace and love). And as running mate, Lula selected the owner of one 
of Brazil’s largest textile manufacturers, José Alencar, with a net worth 
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several hundred million dollars. Alencar brought his centre-right Liberal 
Party into the PT-led coalition fronting Lula.
While  some  see  the  PT’s  growing  moderation  and  the  ever-
increasing dominance of  the  Campo Majoritário as  results  of  internal 
party  democracy  (SAMUELS,  2004),  many  other  observers  and  PT 
insiders, especially on the left, argue otherwise (FLYNN, 2005; MORAES, 
2005; WAINWRIGHT and BANFORD, 2006). These critics argue that the 
Campo Majoritário’s external and thus internal victories were aided by 
the same kinds of slush funds (or  caixa dois) that apparently helped 
Lula’s 2002 campaign. In other words, they claim that the scandals that 
rocked Lula’s administration were similar to the arrangements that had 
been used by the Campo Majoritário to consolidate its control of the PT. 
The more successful  a faction’s candidates were in winning executive 
offices  (governors  and  mayors),  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  legislative 
offices, the more paid government positions the faction could offer its 
members and potential  recruits  from other  factions, and in turn,  the 
better it could perform in internal elections. This does not imply that the 
PT’s emphasis on honesty and transparency was a  farce, but that the 
political group in control of the PT, the Campo Majoritário, was willing to 
use strategies previously rejected by the PT to consolidate its control.
As Moraes explains, Campo Majoritário leaders created a “parallel 
finance network” that “operated as an instrument of discrimination and 
internal  privileges  without  the  knowledge  of  the  collective  decision-
making bodies”, directing both official and unofficial resources to party 
moderates (MORAES, 2005, p. 196-197). This explanation echoes the 
complaints  by leaders  of  the  PT’s  left  factions.  They  claim that  “the 
Campo Majoritário built  its  own political  machine within  the party  to 
advance  its  aim of  achieving  more  flexible  policies”  and  that  “some 
sectors of the party started to have incredibly well-funded campaigns” 
(WAINWRIGHT and BANFORD,  2006,  p.  21-22;  also  23,  25-26,  33). 
Thus, Dirceu consolidated the  Campo Majoritário’s  control over the PT, 
apparently utilising similar tactics that would be used to carve out a 
voting majority in congress during Lula’s Presidency. For the left critics, 
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then, Lula and Dirceu pulled the party to the centre using underhanded 
methods, rather than being pushed by the base.
There is some evidence to support the critics’ position. Already 
for the 1998 elections, the PT top leadership overrode the wishes of the 
left factions and a good part of the party base, at least in its coalitional 
decisions. The  Campo Majoritário leaders decided to ally with the PDT 
(Democratic Labour Party), a populist, nationalist party that continued 
to  rely  on  traditional  Brazilian  political  practices  of  clientelism  and 
personalism. In exchange for accepting PDT leader Leonel Brizola as his 
running  mate,  Lula  and  the  PT  had  to  give  up  running  their  own 
candidate for the governorship of Rio de Janeiro, but could name the 
candidate for vice-governor. The local PT in Rio refused to accept this 
deal and sought to run its own candidate for governor. Indeed, the left 
factions  only  approved  electoral  alliances  with  leftist  parties  or 
progressive factions of centrist parties; they also placed great emphasis 
on  only  working  with  clean and  honest parties  and  politicians. 
Nonetheless, national PT leaders led by Dirceu forced Rio’s PT leadership 
to withdraw their candidate and support the PDT. Though Lula lost the 
presidential race, the PDT-PT ticket won the governor’s race in Rio, and 
it was there that the first corruption scandal linked to Dirceu came to 
light. In 2004, a videotape surfaced showing Dirceu’s top aide – then 
head of Rio’s state lottery – asking for  donations from the owner of a 
bingo hall who was reputed to have strong mafia ties5.
Evidence of  earlier  corruption  within the PT also exists  at  the 
municipal level, especially in the cities controlled by Campo Majoritário 
leaders (see below). Although the PT sought to direct attention to its 
most  successful  cases  of  clean  and  participatory  government,  and 
especially  Porto  Alegre,  other  experiences  were  far  less  successful 
(WAMPLER, 2007). The PT had sufficiently strong internal discipline that 
100  per  cent  of  large  municipalities  (defined  as  more  than 100,000 
residents)  that  they  won  in  1996  and  2000  adopted  Participatory 
Budgeting,  which was partially responsible  for the PT’s reputation for 
good government and had become virtually  synonymous with the  PT 
5 The scandal was first reported in Época (Feb. 11, 2004), Issue 300.
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way of governing (WAMPLER and AVRITZER, 2005). The municipalities 
of  São  Paulo,  Belo  Horizonte,  Santo  André,  and  Ribeirão  Preto  all 
adopted  PB  under  PT  governments,  but  none  of  these  programs 
produced levels of transparency comparable to Porto Alegre. It is now 
increasingly appearing that Porto Alegre’s PB is an exceptional case that 
is far more transparent and has a stronger commitment to social justice 
and  deepening  of  democracy  than  most  other  PB  cases  (WAMPLER, 
2007).  The  lack  of  widespread  knowledge  about  other  PT-run  cities 
allowed the PT to argue that the positive experience in Porto Alegre was 
being replicated across Brazil, thereby helping the party build a coherent 
myth  that  the  PT  way  of  governing  was  based  on  transparency, 
openness, and the deepening of democracy. The point here is that the 
PT branded itself as a participatory, democratic, clean, and transparent 
party and often used the successes of Porto Alegre to demonstrate how 
well  PT  officials  could  implement  innovative  policies  to  transform 
Brazilian life.
The municipalities of Santo André and São Paulo illustrated the 
difficulties  faced  by  the  PT  as  they  sought  to  implement  innovative 
policies at the local level that would help to extend the  social struggle 
into the state but also organise themselves for key national and state 
elections. Both municipal governments had PT mayors in 2001 and 2002 
in  the  run-up  to  the  2002  presidential  election.  Both  governments 
adopted Participatory Budgeting but neither  government  invested the 
necessary  time,  energy  or  financial  capital  to  make them successful 
(WAMPLER, 2007). Pedro Pontual, who directed PB in Santo André from 
1997-2002,  conceded  that  “after  a  project  was  approved  by  the  PB 
council and entered the budget, we didn’t really follow it anymore. We 
didn’t  really  understand  how  a  public  policy  was  developed  and 
implemented” (Pontual,  2003). In São Paulo, after Marta Suplicy was 
elected mayor in 2000, she relied on a patronage system that had been 
created in the 1950s but had been rejected by the previous PT mayor, 
Luiza  Erundina  (1989-1992).  Mayor  Suplicy  turned over  parts  of  the 
mayoral  administrative  apparatus  to  political  allies  to  ensure  their 
support. Her support for PB was lukewarm, at best,  and the process 
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there  lacked  transparency  (WAMPLER,  2007).  São  Paulo  and  Santo 
André were two of the most important municipalities to then-candidate 
Lula as he began his run for the presidency; the demands of running 
campaigns  trumped  the  effort  to  deepen  democracy,  promote  social 
justice, and create basic transparency. In other words, the PT in some 
cities  was  already  moving  away  from an  emphasis  on  participatory, 
clean, transparent politics. The party used its control of powerful São 
Paulo municipalities to provide support for Lula’s campaign. An emphasis 
on  the  importance  of  innovation  and  participatory  politics  were  still 
present elsewhere in Brazil (Recife, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre), but it 
was  not  a  principal  focus  of  the  São  Paulo  faction  of  the  Campo 
Majoritário.
The  PT way  of  governing,  then,  was  adopted  by  many of  its 
municipal  governments,  but that is only part of  the picture. Many of 
Lula’s  2002  campaign  fund-raisers  were  active  in  the  PT’s  local 
administrations,  especially  in  the  state  of  São  Paulo,  where  they 
engaged in the same sorts of financial practices for which they are now 
being  investigated  (ATTUCH,  2006;  see  also  Folha  de  São  Paulo, 
10/31/2005, p. 1, A7). Lower-level PT officials in municipalities appear 
to have been involved in financial transactions that gave them access to 
revenues from public and private bus companies, which were sources of 
the  PT’s  caixa  dois as  well  as  more  ordinary  kickback  schemes.  In 
Ribeirão Preto, for example, Rogério Buratti, a former advisor to then PT 
mayor  Antônio  Palocci  (1993-1996;  2000-2002),  was  imprisoned 
temporarily in 2005 on charges of money laundering in transactions with 
bus companies  and was accused of  overbilling  for  garbage collection 
services (Folha de São Paulo 8/18/2005, p. 1, A4). Buratti implicated 
Palocci, who was ultimately forced to resign as Lula’s finance minister in 
March  2006,  because  of  these  and  related  charges  of  operating  a 
mensalão scheme  of  his  own  when  he  was  mayor  (Jornal  do  Brasil 
3/28/2006,  p.  1).  Corruption in  the PT thus began prior  to its  2002 
presidential victory, but was accompanied by genuine efforts to overhaul 
local political and policy processes. Within the PT there are reformist and 
corrupt sectors at all levels of the party organization, which suggests 
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that the PT carried both reform-minded and business-as-usual members 
into the presidency.
If the PT’s left wing found itself  consistently out of power and 
outmanoeuvred by the Campo Majoritário, why did it stay in the party? 
Leftist  factions  also  engaged  in  internal  party  battles  to  obtain 
government positions and increase the size of their internal voting blocs. 
The left factions generally garnered around 45 per cent of the vote for 
the PT’s national presidency, which gave them hope that they would win 
at  some  not  too-distant  point.  The  left  wing  of  the  party  also  had 
nowhere else to go; the PSTU, which some purged PT members founded 
in 1993 as a left alternative, has never received enough votes to elect 
even one congressional  representative (FREIRE DE LACERDA, 2002)6. 
The relatively high level of internal support given to the left factions also 
established their continuing importance within the party, which meant 
that  the  Campo  Majoritário could  not  ignore  them  in  an  eventual 
distribution of national government posts. This leads to our third and 
fourth  interweaving  strands:  economic  constraints  and  multi-party 
presidentialism.
Maintaining Austerity and Alliances in a Multi-Party Presidential 
System
After Lula won in October 2002, he and his top advisors had two 
months  to  put  together  his  cabinet  before  the  January inauguration. 
They faced several countervailing pressures. First, as detailed below, in 
order  to  placate  the  financial  markets,  Lula  had  committed  to 
maintaining fiscal  austerity during his campaign, and his  cabinet and 
policy choices were expected to reflect this commitment. Second, Lula 
not  only  had  to  satiate  the  Campo  Majoritário’s desire  for  cabinet 
6 Two years after Lula’s victory in 2002, several members of left factions within the PT 
bolted the party following the PT’s expulsion of a senator and three federal deputies who 
had voted against  a  government-proposed social  security  reform.  They formed a  new 
party, the PSOL (Party of Socialism and Liberty), which managed to win three seats in the 
chamber of deputies in the 2006 elections (with just 1.2 per cent of the vote). The PSOL’s 
presidential  candidate  came in  third,  with  roughly  seven  per  cent  of  the  vote.  Some 
charismatic politicians of the left might find a home in the PSOL, but the poor showing of 
their  legislative candidates  will  likely  make PT dissidents  more carefully  consider  their 
attacks on President Lula’s policies.
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positions  but  also  appease  the  left  factions,  who  had  swallowed  his 
overtures  to  the  right  and  compromises  with  capital  in  the  hope  of 
rewards. Third, Lula was expected to dole out posts to members of his 
electoral alliance, as is traditionally done in Brazil’s multi-party system, 
where  no  president  arrives  to  office  without  a  coalition  behind  him 
(HUNTER and POWER, 2005). A fourth apparent consideration was that, 
as mentioned above, the PT’s coffers were R$ 55 million in the red. The 
solution, it seems, included increasing the size of the cabinet, up to 36 
members  from  Cardoso’s  21,  and  the  mensalão scheme,  involving 
various government offices, public contracts, and regular side payments 
to  those  under-rewarded  with  administrative  posts  (RAILE,  PEREIRA, 
and POWER, 2006). The 36 cabinet slots were used to reward members 
of the PT and their closest allies while the mensalão scheme was used to 
attract potential allies in the national legislature.
As  the  early  opinion  polls  of  the  2002  presidential  campaign 
showed  Lula  gaining  a  strong  lead,  foreign  investors  began  showing 
signs of nervousness about the future Brazilian government’s ability and 
willingness  to  make  its  debt  payments.  Their  fears  were  stoked  by 
Argentina’s default in 2001, Brazil’s low level of reserves, and by the 
PT’s prior proposals for debt moratoria or renegotiations. Despite Lula’s 
moderate  platform  and  business  suits,  as  his  poll  numbers 
strengthened,  Brazil’s  currency  weakened  and  investment  banks 
stopped  recommending  Brazilian  bonds.  Martínez  and  Santiso  cite  a 
report by BCP Securities from late May called Da Lula Monster in which 
analyst Walter Molano writes: “there seems to be a sense of panic as 
economic agents realise that Lula will win the elections” (MARTINEZ and 
SANTIZO, 2003, p. 371). In June, Lula’s campaign issued a statement 
promising  that,  if  elected  president,  Lula  would  not  employ  capital 
controls, would not renegotiate the external debt, and would maintain 
the  Cardoso  government’s  financial  commitments.  This  Letter  to  the 
Brazilian People (Carta ao Povo Brasileiro), derided as the Letter to Calm 
the Bankers (Carta para Acalmar Banqueiro) by its critics, seems not to 
have had a tremendous effect on foreign investors, though it caused a 
stir in Brazil.  By the following month, Brazil’s currency, the  real, had 
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dropped to 3.50 to the dollar from a level of 2.30 at the start of the 
year,  investment  banks  continued  downgrading  Brazil’s  bonds,  and 
capital flight doubled from June’s levels (MARTINEZ and SANTIZO, 2003, 
p. 370, 373). It was not until the Central Bank raised interest rates, the 
IMF announced a $30 billion loan that had the explicit support of the US 
government, and Lula and the other presidential candidates agreed to 
respect  the terms that the  real recovered some ground (COUTO and 
BAIA, 2006, p. 16; MARTINEZ and SANTISO, 2003, p. 374). The IMF 
loan was structured so that most of the money would be dispersed well 
after the inauguration in 2003 to encourage the new president to honour 
the agreement’s targets for a budget surplus of 3.75 per cent (dedicated 
to repaying the debt) and a low inflation rate.
Thus,  once  elected,  Lula  found  the  government  in  a  fiscal 
straitjacket,  as  Samuels  (2003)  predicted  for  Cardoso’s  successor. 
Samuels details several vicious circles trapping Brazil’s government: to 
maintain stable exchange and inflation rates as well as attract foreign 
investment, Lula would have to maintain high interest rates; in turn, this 
increases government debt, which scares off investment dollars; and to 
jumpstart the stagnant economic economy and attend to the needs of 
poor Brazilians, Lula would need to increase social  spending, yet this 
interferes  with  the  budget  surplus  requirements  to  pay  off  the  debt 
(SAMUELS,  2003).  Samuels  argues:  “If  the  government  does  not 
maintain budget surpluses, the debt level may rise, creating downward 
pressure on the  real and thus upward pressure on prices and interest 
rates,  perpetuating  or  even  worsening  the  vicious  circle  of  debt” 
(SAMUELS, 2003, p 567).
The tight  constraints  on Lula’s  future administration  had been 
made clear by the financial markets during the campaign, yet they were 
still  jittery  about  Lula’s  policy direction after  the election.  To end all 
doubts,  Lula’s  team  sent  even  stronger  signals  about  the  PT 
administration’s  commitment  to  austerity:  it  announced  that  the 
government’s target budget surplus would be 4.25 per cent, even higher 
than the IMF had required, and that the top economic positions would be 
filled by businessmen and technocrats approved of by Wall Street and 
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BOVESPA.  Eight  members  of  Lula’s  36-member  cabinet  were 
technocrats without party affiliation, and nine of 37 if one includes the 
President of the Central Bank (COUTO and BAIA, 2006, p. 7).
In order to sell  the PT left on the capitulation to the financial 
markets, Lula’s group took two tacks. It presented the policy continuity 
with  the  Cardoso  government  as  both  unavoidable,  given  economic 
constraints, and short-term (WAINWRIGHT and BANFORD, 2006, p 28). 
And it gave several cabinet seats to leaders of the left factions and to 
more  leftist  members  of  the  Campo  Majoritário.  After  ensuring  a 
market-friendly economic team and a space for the left,  Lula’s group 
needed to secure the Campo Majoritário’s dominance in the government 
– granting it twelve of the PT’s 20 seats – but this left little room for the 
eight  other  parties  that  had  supported  Lula  in  round  two  of  the 
presidential race. In Lula’s first cabinet, each alliance partner (save one 
tiny party) only received one seat. More importantly, the two largest 
potential  congressional  allies  for  the  PT  government  were  initially 
excluded (COUTO and BAIA, 2006, p 4, 7).
Typically,  Brazilian  presidents  distribute  cabinet  seats  to 
members of their coalition in order to build a congressional majority. In 
the country’s  democratic  history (including the Second Republic  from 
1946-1964), only one president’s party has had a majority on its own 
(which lasted just a year), given that more than a dozen parties are 
generally represented in the congress. In the 2002 election, nineteen 
parties won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and ten in the Senate. 
The PT was the largest party in the Chamber, but had just 91 seats, a 
great  distance  from the  257  that  it  needed  to  establish  a  majority. 
Including  Lula’s  alliance  partners,  the PT  congressional  coalition  only 
reached 219 seats. Eventually, Lula brought the third-largest party in 
the Chamber, the PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), 
into his cabinet in order to achieve a congressional majority, but he only 
gave the party two seats. According to Raile, Pereira and Power (2006), 
the disproportionality between the number of cabinet seats granted to 
Lula’s  coalition  members  and  the  number  of  congressional  seats 
coalition members  controlled created the necessity  of  side-payments. 
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Like Goes (apud FLYNN, 2005), they compare the party composition in 
the cabinets of Lula and Cardoso. Raile, Pereira and Power (2006) show 
that Lula’s cabinet was more disproportional than any other since 1988, 
as  well  as  being virtually  monopolised  by the president’s  party;  this 
decreased his ability to keep his coalition partners happy – and voting 
with him in congress– and pushed the government to buy loyalty by 
other means (RAILE, PEREIRA, and POWER, 2006) 7.
During  his  hearing  before  the  Congressional  Investigation 
Committee,  the  PT’s  treasurer,  Soares,  admitted providing money  to 
congress members in the PT and other parties, but he argued that the 
payments were not bribes but were to help with campaign costs (Estado 
de São Paulo, 7/21/2005, p. 1, A5). We may never know who invented 
the idea of side-payments. Was it the PT leadership, searching for a way 
to maintain its internal and external coalitions? Or was it Souza, who 
presented the idea to the PT treasurer as a way out of campaign debts 
both for the PT and its allies? The latter idea sounds plausible, given 
that  Souza  has  been  formally  charged  with  orchestrating  a  similar 
scheme for the PSDB in Minas Gerais four years earlier.8 One thing is 
clear: these needs – for a way to reward internal and external allies and 
for funds to cover campaign costs – emerged simultaneously. Together, 
they pushed the PT leadership  into  risking  the party’s  reputation  for 
clean government. The Campo Majoritário’s support for illegal activities 
temporarily  strengthened  the  party  by  retiring  campaign  debts  while 
also allowing President Lula to cobble together legislative majorities. The 
PT, formed with a large union and social movement base to transform 
Brazil,  was  ultimately  induced  by  economic,  institutional,  and  social 
pressures to engage in the very behaviours that the party had been 
established to reform.
7 Strengthening this interpretation is the fact that large bank withdrawals made by Souza’s 
firm in 2003 and 2004 coincide with important votes in congress (CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, 
jul. 05, 2005, p. 1-6).
8 According to the Attorney General who brought the charges in November 2007, Antonio 
Fernando de Souza, the Minas operation “served as the ‘origin and laboratory’ of the PT 
mensalão” (ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, nov. 23, 2007, p. 1, A4-A6).
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Conclusion
The  PT’s  fall  from  grace  is  best  explained  by  the  domestic 
institutional  pressures  that  induced  party  leaders  to  change  their 
political strategies, by national and international markets that provided a 
limited  range  of  options,  and  by  intra-party  conflicts  regarding  the 
strategies that should be utilized to govern effectively and win national 
power. These are overlapping factors that led the PT to turn to illegal 
activities  as  a  way  to  fund their  campaigns  and  establish  legislative 
majorities. Recognizing the party’s extreme disadvantage in campaign 
finance, and thus in elections generally, the dominant faction’s leaders 
began  moderating  the  PT’s  rhetoric  and  policies  in  order  to  attract 
campaign contributions both on and off the books, first at the local level 
in select cities, and later at the national level. The  Campo Majoritário 
leadership  used  its  financial  advantages  over  the  other  factions  to 
reward  its  supporters  and  enhance  its  position  in  internal  struggles 
concerning  the  party’s  ideological  direction.  The  negative  reaction  to 
Lula’s  candidacy  by  international  financial  markets  strengthened  the 
Campo Majoritário’s efforts to push the PT to the centre and constrained 
Lula’s policy and cabinet choices. At the same time, the left factions’ 
internal strength meant that the Lula government would have to reward 
it somehow as well, and cabinet seats became the reward. As Lula took 
office, these pressures combined with the party’s campaign debts and 
the  need to  build  a  legislative  majority  without  using  the  traditional 
method of distributing cabinet positions pushed the leadership to move 
beyond taking illegal campaign contributions and supporting the Campo 
Majoritário’s own members to buying the support of other parties.
As  of  December  2007,  the  only  formal  punishment  of  those 
involved in the  mensalão was the expulsion from Congress of several 
deputies (from various parties, including the PT) and the expulsion from 
the PT of Soares. Many other PT figures resigned from their positions in 
the Congress, in the party (including the PT president José Genoíno), 
and in the administration (including the chief of staff José Dirceu as well 
as the finance minister Antônio Palocci). In August 2007, the Federal 
Supreme Court indicted 40 politicians and businessmen in relation to the 
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mensalão, including Soares, Genoíno, Dirceu, and Souza. However, as 
Taylor  (Forthcoming  2009)  notes,  despite  several  highly  publicised 
corruption scandals, including the impeachment of a sitting president in 
1992, very few national politicians have served jail time since the return 
to  democracy.  Taylor  argues  that  Brazil’s  accountability  institutions 
emphasise investigating corruption allegations, but none focuses on on-
going  monitoring  to  prevent  corruption  or  on  punishing  those  found 
guilty.  The  impunity  of  Brazilian  politicians  surely  contributed  to  the 
calculations  of  the individual  leaders who orchestrated the  mensalão. 
Indeed, the principal players linked to the  mensalão will likely emerge 
relatively  unscathed,  without  paying  much  of  a  price  for  their 
involvement.
Results  of  the  2006  general  elections  mostly  bear  this  out. 
Genoíno  and  Palocci  were  both  elected  as  federal  deputies,  as  was 
Genoíno’s  brother  (whose  aide  had  been  caught  with  money  in  his 
underwear).  Lula,  who  faced  threats  of  impeachment  from  the 
opposition parties after the scandal broke, went on to win re-election, 
again in the second round, and again with 61% of the valid vote. In 
their  analysis  of  the 2006 race,  Hunter  and Power  (2007,  p.  11-14) 
suggest that Lula’s success in avoiding the taint of scandal derived from 
voters’ lack of access to information, low levels of education, and the 
material gains among Brazil’s largest constituency: the poor, especially 
the rural poor in the Northern and Northeastern states. Lula appears to 
have  been  punished  by  more  highly  educated,  well-to-do  voters, 
especially  in  the  richer  Southern  states  that  contribute  fewer  voters 
overall, but Lula’s appeal as a member of the working class who had 
improved  the  purchasing  power  of  low-income  Brazilians,  led  to  his 
wide-spread  support  among  poor  voters  in  the  North  and  Northeast 
(SAMUELS, 2008).
However, the PT as a collective has paid dearly. Many of its top 
leaders  resigned.  Eight  deputies,  a  senator,  and  several  hundred 
prominent members abandoned the PT to create a new party on the left, 
the PSOL (Party of Socialism and Liberty), which won enough votes to 
prevent a first-round victory for Lula in the 2006 presidential campaign 
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(see fn 6). Their exit began before the mensalão broke, but the scandal 
and the PT’s unwillingness to change leadership afterwards helped push 
them  to  the  door.  Support  from  hundreds  of  thousands  of  social 
movement  activists  has  also  waned,  as  the  largest  movement 
organizations have published condemnations of the PT’s failures in office 
(HOCHSTETLER, 2006 p. 21-22). Major social movements did back Lula 
in the second round of the 2006 election, but more as a defence against 
the alternative than as an enthusiastic endorsement. If a non-PT ethical 
movement  develops,  it  will  most  likely  emerge  from these  civil  and 
political  society  sectors,  as  they  work  to  check  abuses  of  power 
committed  by  government  officials,  including  their  former  allies  now 
working within Lula’s government.
In the 2006 congressional elections, the PT lost over two million 
voters  (13  percent  of  its  2002 electorate)  and saw the  party  bench 
reduced to under 16 percent from over 18 percent of the seats in the 
lower house of congress, where it no longer holds even a plurality. The 
2006 election results revealed that the PT’s constituency has shifted, 
with the strongest base of support moving from the PT’s origins in the 
richer and more industrialized southern states like São Paulo and Rio 
Grande do Sul to the poorest regions of the Northeast and North, where 
the party won five governorships (including Bahia, one of the country’s 
most populous) and Lula received his highest vote shares9. This shift 
was likely driven by the PT government’s creation of the beginnings of a 
welfare state – particularly the bolsa família (family grant) program. The 
ten states where Lula received the highest percentage of the vote in the 
first  round  of  the  election  were  the  ten  states  with  the  highest 
percentages of families benefited by the  bolsa família (NASCIMENTO, 
2006). It appears that the  principal  element left from the  PT way of 
governing is (re)distribution, albeit in small amounts. Lula’s re-election 
in 2006 offers hope to only the most optimistic that the PT will be able 
to transform traditional political processes that the PT had long derided.
9 Interestingly,  in  the  legislative  elections,  the  PT  continued  to  perform  better  in  its 
traditional  urban,  industrialized  strongholds  than  in  the  rural  areas  of  the  North  and 
Northeast (HUNTER and POWER, 2007, p. 8) that now favor Lula and PT candidates for 
governor.
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The PT lost  its  ability  to  distinguish  itself  from other Brazilian 
parties on ethical grounds. In the 2006 election campaign, Lula rebutted 
the  opposition’s  accusations  against  him  with  charges  of  his  own 
regarding their alleged corruption. The PT campaign accused Lula’s main 
opponent, Geraldo Alckmin (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, PSDB), 
of  covering  up corruption  during  his  term as  governor  of  São  Paulo 
based on the PSDB’s record of blocking dozens of state congressional 
investigations. And Lula revived claims of corruption under the Cardoso 
presidencies,  including allegations that deputies were paid to support 
the  amendment  allowing presidential  re-election,  that  banks received 
preferential treatment during the devaluation of the  real, and that the 
regional  development  agencies  Sudam and  Sudene  illegally  diverted 
public resources.
Lula’s election as president in 2002 offered petistas the hope of 
increasing their political power and transforming Brazilian politics. While 
the PT will  continue as one of  the country’s  most  important  political 
parties, Brazil has transformed the PT more than the PT has transformed 
Brazil.  Most  importantly,  the  PT  has  lost  its  reputation  for  clean 
government. The  PT way of governing was explicitly designed to allow 
interested citizens to be involved in public expenditures planning and 
day-to-day monitoring. The resistance of the PT national leadership to 
initiate any substantive reform efforts in these directions suggests that 
the impulse to reform Brazilian institutions is no longer a core feature of 
the PT’s politics. The absence of a drive to overhaul Brazilian politics is 
perhaps  the  most  significant  result  of  Lula’s  ascendancy  to  the 
presidency; the party that most stridently sought reform is now led by 
individuals and groups who are quite willing to play politics using long-
standing traditions and practices. The PT set out, in the early 1980s, to 
finish off corruption and lead Brazil in a new direction. Having gained the 
presidency twenty years later, the apparent willingness of PT leaders to 
use  corrupt  methods  as  basic  components  of  their  electoral  and 
governing strategies suggests that the distinctive  PT way of governing 
has  ended  and  that  Brazil’s  traditional  politics  remain  entrenched. 
Further  scandals  after  the  mensalão –  the  ambulance  mafia  scandal 
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involving scores of congressional representatives from several parties, 
including  the  PT,  and  dossier-gate,  in  which  members  of  Lula’s  re-
election  campaign  attempted  to  purchase  apparently  fraudulent 
evidence of a rival’s involvement in the ambulance mafia – continue to 
tarnish the PT’s image, probably making future attempts by the party to 
renew  its  anti-corruption  stance  unfeasible.  Indeed,  from  being 
perceived as Brazil’s most honest party, the PT is now seen as being the 
most corrupt (Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006).
Efforts to promote the PT way of governing are likely to be taken 
up outside the PT or far from the national leadership. It is possible that 
reform movements will arise anew within the PT. Efforts in this direction 
began in 2005 for the PT’s internal elections, as candidates for the party 
presidency  called  for  a  refounding  of  the  party,  yet  the  Campo 
Majoritário’s candidate won. In early 2007, in anticipation of the Third 
Party Congress to be held in August, some PT factions began launching 
calls  for  ending the impunity  of  those involved in  the  mensalão and 
ending the dominance of the Campo Majoritário and the São Paulo group 
(Folha de São Paulo, 2/11/2007,p. 1, A4; Gazeta Mercantil, 4/5/2007, p. 
A8). Yet the major ethics reform candidate did not even make it to the 
second round of internal elections for president in December. Still, even 
if  internal reformers are able to wrest control away from the  Campo 
Majoritário,  they  will  now  have  a  more  difficult  time  convincing  a 
sceptical public that the PT is different from other political parties. The 
national  PT  leadership  has  mired  the  party  in  corruption,  thereby 
suggesting that non-PT actors will take the lead in the effort to promote 
transparency, honesty, and openness in governmental affairs.
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